Dr. Cameron Boult

My research focuses on the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and meta-normative theory. I have worked on the nature of justified belief, radical scepticism, and epistemic anti-realism. I am especially interested in fundamental questions about the similarities and differences between epistemology and other normative disciplines, such as ethics, or aesthetics. More recently, I’ve been exploring questions about epistemic blame, and the relevance and value of the notion of “intellectual virtue” for democratic theory and practice.

website 

Academia.edu

Publications

Articles

Boult, C. Forthcoming. Excuses, Exemptions, and Derivative Norms, Ratio.

Boult, C., Kelp, C. & Simion, M. Forthcoming. Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content , in Greco, J. & Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, Cambridge University Press.

Kelp, C., Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. & Simion, M. ForthcomingHoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa, Synthese, Epub ahead of print DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5.

Boult, C. 2018. An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism, Episteme, 15(2):141-153.

Boult, C. 2017. Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse, dialectica, 71(1): 85-99.

Boult, C. 2017. Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction, Synthese, 194(10): 4065-4081.

Boult, C. 2016. Knowledge and Attributability, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Epub ahead of print DOI:10.1111/papq.12175. 

Boult, C. 2016. Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study, Acta Analytica, 32(2): 223–244.

Boult, C. 2016. Excusing Prospective Agents, Logos & Episteme, 7(2):119-128.

Boult, C. 2013. Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination, Philosophia, 41 (4):1125-1133.

Boult, C. & Pritchard, D. 2013. Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo, Philosophia, 41(1):27-35.

Book Reviews

Boult, C. Forthcoming. Review of The Brain in a Vat (Goldberg, S. (ed.), Cambridge University Press), International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 

Boult, C. 2017. Review of Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (Fairweather, A. & Flanagan, O. (eds.), Cambridge University Press), Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14(5): 604-607.

Recent and Upcoming Talks

2019

“Epistemic Normativity in Groups”, Roundtable discussion, Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, University of British Columbia (June)

Comments on Michael Hannon’s “Truth, Understanding, and Deliberative Democracy”, 2nd Social Epistemology Network Event, Yonsei University – South Korea (June)

2018

“Epistemic Blame?”, 2018 Annual Meeting of the Western Canadian Philosophical Association. University of Calgary

“Epistemic Blame?”, Cogito New Directions in Social Epistemology Speaker Series, University of Glasgow

“The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance”, First Flemish Epistemology Workshop, KU Leuven

“The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance”, Cardiff Social Epistemology Workshop: Themes from Sandy Goldberg”, Cardiff University

“Epistemic Judgment and Motivation” (with Sebastian Köhler), The Future of Normativity, Kent University

“The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance”, European Epistemology Network Meeting, VU Amsterdam

“Against Epistemic Blame”, Pre-Read Epistemology Work-in-Progress Workshop, VU Amsterdam

“The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance”, Canadian Philosophy Association Annual Congress, Montreal

“Intellectually Responsible Democracy”, Faculty of Arts Speaker Series, Brandon University.

2017

“Political Ignorance and Epistemic Sensibility”, Guest Lecture in Epistemology, Dec 15 2017, Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, KU Leuven.

“Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse”, 2017 Aristotelian Society Open Sessions, University of Edinburgh.

“Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content” (with Chris Kelp and Mona Simion), Bled Epistemology Conference 2017.

“Response to Saskia Aerts'”The Formation of Epistemic Authority in the Neoplatonic Textual Community”, 3rd CLAW-DWMC Symposium.

“Epistemic Judgment and Motivation”, Leuven-Southampton Epistemology Workshop, KU Leuven.

2016

“Excuses, Exemptions, and Derivative Norms”, XXV SIUCC: SEFA’s Workshop with Timothy Williamson, University of Valencia.

“Excusing Prospective Agents”, European Epistemology Network Meeting, Paris.

“Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content”, Second Leuven-Cologne-Bonn Epistemology Meeting, KU Leuven.

Response to Daniel Whiting’s “Rational Belief as (a Sort of) Safe Belief”, Workshop on the Normative Significance of Normative Beliefs, University of Southampton.

2015

“Is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?”, CLAW/RTAP Seminar, KU Leuven.

“Knowledge and Attributability”, Epistemic Norms Conference, KU Leuven.

“Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse”, First Leuven-Cologne-Bonn Epistemology Meeting, University of Cologne.

“Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction”, JustGroningen: Workshop on Epistemic Justification, University of Groningen. 

“Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction”, Leuven-Bristol Workshop, KU Leuven.

“Epistemic Conditions on ‘Ought’: E=K as a Case Study”, CLAW/RTAP Seminar, KU Leuven.

Teaching

2019-2020

Fall

Intro to Philosophy (70:160)

Topics: Analytic Philosophy II (70: 497)

Winter

Theory of Knowledge (70:261)

History of Analytic Philosophy (70:375)

2018-2019

Fall

Intro to Philosophy (70:160)

Philosophy of Mind (70:374)

Winter

Intro to Philosophy (70:160)

Theory of Knowledge (70:261)

Topics: Analytic Philosophy I (70: 496)

2017-2018

Fall

Predicate Logic (70:258)

Topics: Analytic Philosophy II (70:497)

Winter

Intro to Philosophy (70:160)

History of Analytic Philosophy (70:375)