Dr. Cameron Boult

My research focuses on the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and meta-normative theory. I have worked on the nature of justified belief, radical scepticism, and epistemic anti-realism. I am especially interested in fundamental questions about the similarities and differences between epistemology and other normative disciplines, such as ethics, or aesthetics. More recently, I’ve been exploring questions about epistemic blame, testimonial injustice, and political ignorance (and the intersection of these topics).

​2022-2024: I am the principle investigator on a two-year SSHRC Insight Development Grant titled “Norms of Epistemic Criticism”. The project looks at normative questions about our practice of criticizing one another for epistemic failings.

2021-2023: I am the principle investigator on a two-year BURCSSHRC Research Grant titled “Blame for Testimonial Injustice”. The project examines the relationship between epistemic blame and testimonial injustice.

2019-2022: I am the principal investigator on a two-year (+1 year extension due to COVID 19) Research Manitoba New Investigator Operating Grant. The project investigates the nature and norms of the practice of blaming people for epistemic failings. As part of this research project, I will be a visiting researcher at Glasgow University’s COGITO epistemology research group, in spring/summer 2020 and 2021.




The Puzzle of Epistemic Blame: On the Nature and Norms of Epistemic Relationships, under contract with Oxford University Press.

Journal Articles

Forthcoming. Epistemic Blame. Philosophy Compass. 

Forthcoming. Standing to Epistemically Blame. Synthese (TC: New Directions in Social Epistemology) 

Forthcoming. Pragmatism, Truth, and Cognitive Agency, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 

2021. The Significance of Epistemic Blame. Erkenntnis. Online First.

2021. The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance, American Philosophical Quarterly, 58(3):217-232.

2020. There is a Distinctively Epistemic Kind of Blame, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Online First.

2020. Epistemic Judgment and Motivation, The Philosophical Quarterly (with Sebastian Köhler), 70(281):738-758.

2019. Excuses, Exemptions, and Derivative Norms, Ratio, 32(2):150-158.

2018. An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism, Episteme, 15(2):141-153.

2017. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa, Synthese (with Kelp, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. & Simion, M.), Epub ahead of print DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5.

2017. Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse, dialectica, 71(1): 85-99.

2017. Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction, Synthese, 194(10): 4065-4081.

2017. Knowledge and Attributability, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(1): 329-350.

2017. Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study, Acta Analytica, 32(2): 223–244.

2016. Excusing Prospective Agents, Logos & Episteme, 7(2):119-128.

2013. Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination, Philosophia, 41 (4):1125-1133.

2013. Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo, Philosophia (with Duncan Pritchard), 41(1):27-35.

Book Chapters

2021. The Epistemic Responsibilities of Citizens in a Democracy, in The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology, Hannon, M. & DeRidder, J. (eds.), Routledge.

2020. Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content, in Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches (with Kelp, C., Simion, M. and Schnurr, J.), Greco, J. & Kelp, C. (eds.), Cambridge University Press.

Book Reviews

2019. Review of The Brain in a Vat (Goldberg, S. (ed.), Cambridge University Press), International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 9(1): 75-82.

2017. Review of Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (Fairweather, A. & Flanagan, O. (eds.), Cambridge University Press), Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14(5): 604-607.

Recent and Upcoming Presentations


“TBA”, Epistemic Wrongs and Epistemic Reparations Workshop, African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Johannesburg (November)

“Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability”, European Epistemology Network Meeting, University of Glasgow

“The Puzzle of Epistemic Blame”, Responsibility for Beliefs Workshop, University of Helsinki

Invited comments on “The Quality of Thought”, Colloquium Session Pacific APA, Vancouver, BC

“Epistemic Criticism and Epistemic Risk”, The Social and Political Dimensions of Epistemic Risk, University of Seville

“Norms of Epistemic Criticism”, Epistemic Blame: Theory and Practice Workshop, University of Johannesburg

Invited comments on Eugene Chislenko’s “Blame as Attention”, Symposium Session, Central APA, Chicago, Il.


Book symposium on “The Puzzle of Epistemic Blame”, COGITO Centre for Epistemology, University of Glasgow

“Democratic Participation and the Value of Epistemic Blame”, MANCEPT Workshops in Political Philosophy – Epistemic Responsibilities of Democratic Citizens, University of Manchester September

 “TBA”, European Epistemology Network Meeting, University of Glasgow [CANCELLED]

“A Relationship-Based Account of Epistemic Blame”, Brown Bag Meetings, CONCEPT Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition, University of Cologne January

“A Relationship-Based Account of Epistemic Blame”, Symposium presentation, Commentators: Tim Kwiatek (Columbia University) and Sara Ghaffari (Bowling Green State University), 2021 Eastern APA Meeting, New York, NY


Epistemic Blame and the Business Condition on Standing to Blame”, Social (Distance) Epistemology: Weekly Virtual Events, Social Epistemology Network Online

“A Relationship-Based Account of Epistemic Blame”, COGITO Zoom Work in Progress Seminar, University of Glasgow

“Epistemic Blame and the Business Condition on Standing to Blame”, Philosophy Visiting Speaker Colloquium, University of Manitoba


Comments on Michael Hannon’s “Truth, Understanding, and Deliberative Democracy” and Leandro De Brasi’s “Citizen Incompetence and the Epistemic Structure of Society”, 2nd Social Epistemology Network Event, Yonsei University – South Korea

“Epistemic Normativity in Groups”, Roundtable discussion, Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, University of British Columbia


“Epistemic Blame?”, 2018 Annual Meeting of the Western Canadian Philosophical Association. University of Calgary

“Epistemic Blame?”, Cogito New Directions in Social Epistemology Speaker Series, University of Glasgow

“The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance”, First Flemish Epistemology Workshop, KU Leuven

“The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance”, Cardiff Social Epistemology Workshop: Themes from Sandy Goldberg”, Cardiff University

“Epistemic Judgment and Motivation” (with Sebastian Köhler), The Future of Normativity, Kent University

“The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance”, European Epistemology Network Meeting, VU Amsterdam

“Against Epistemic Blame”, Pre-Read Epistemology Work-in-Progress Workshop, VU Amsterdam

“The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance”, Canadian Philosophy Association Annual Congress, Montreal

“Intellectually Responsible Democracy”, Faculty of Arts Speaker Series, Brandon University


“Political Ignorance and Epistemic Sensibility”, Guest Lecture in Epistemology, Dec 15 2017, Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, KU Leuven

“Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse”, 2017 Aristotelian Society Open Sessions, University of Edinburgh

“Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content” (with Chris Kelp and Mona Simion), Bled Epistemology Conference 2017

“Response to Saskia Aerts'”The Formation of Epistemic Authority in the Neoplatonic Textual Community”, 3rd CLAW-DWMC Symposium

“Epistemic Judgment and Motivation”, Leuven-Southampton Epistemology Workshop, KU Leuven


“Excuses, Exemptions, and Derivative Norms”, XXV SIUCC: SEFA’s Workshop with Timothy Williamson, University of Valencia.

“Excusing Prospective Agents”, European Epistemology Network Meeting, Paris

“Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content”, Second Leuven-Cologne-Bonn Epistemology Meeting, KU Leuven

Response to Daniel Whiting’s “Rational Belief as (a Sort of) Safe Belief”, Workshop on the Normative Significance of Normative Beliefs, University of Southampton


“Is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?”, CLAW/RTAP Seminar, KU Leuven

“Knowledge and Attributability”, Epistemic Norms Conference, KU Leuven

“Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse”, First Leuven-Cologne-Bonn Epistemology Meeting, University of Cologne

“Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction”, JustGroningen: Workshop on Epistemic Justification, University of Groningen

“Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction”, Leuven-Bristol Workshop, KU Leuven

“Epistemic Conditions on ‘Ought’: E=K as a Case Study”, CLAW/RTAP Seminar, KU Leuven




Intro to Philosophy (70:160)

Theory of Knowledge (70:261)


Intro to Philosophy (70:160)

Topics: Analytic Philosophy I (70:497)