My research focuses on the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and meta-normative theory. I have worked on the nature of justified belief, radical scepticism, and epistemic anti-realism. I am especially interested in fundamental questions about the similarities and differences between epistemology and other normative disciplines, such as ethics, or aesthetics. More recently, I’ve been exploring the relevance and value of the notion of “intellectual responsibility” for democratic theory and practice.
website (with links to papers and CV)
Boult, C., Kelp, C. & Simion, M. (Invited). Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content , in Greco, J. & Kelp, C. (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, Cambridge University Press.
Kelp, C., Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. & Simion, M.)(2017). Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa, Synthese, Epub ahead of print DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5.
Boult, C. (2017). Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse, dialectica, 71(1): 85-99.
Boult, C. (2017). An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism, Episteme, Epub ahead of print DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.46
Boult, C. (2016). Knowledge and Attributability, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Epub ahead of print DOI:10.1111/papq.12175.
Boult, C. (2016). Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction, Synthese, Epub ahead of print DOI:10.1007/s11229-016-1127-8.
Boult, C. (2016). Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study, Acta Analytica, 32(2): 223–244.
Boult, C. (2016). Excusing Prospective Agents, Logos & Episteme, 7(2):119-128.
Boult, C. (2013). Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination, Philosophia, 41 (4):1125-1133.
Boult, C. & Pritchard, D. (2013). Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo, Philosophia, 41(1):27-35.
Boult, C. (Forthcoming). Review of Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (Fairweather, A. & Flanagan, O. (eds.), Cambridge University Press), Journal of Moral Philosophy.
“Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse”, 2017 Aristotelian Society Open Sessions, University of Edinburgh.
“Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content” (with Chris Kelp and Mona Simion), Bled Epistemology Conference 2017.
“Response to Saskia Aerts'”The Formation of Epistemic Authority in the Neoplatonic Textual Community”, 3rd CLAW-DWMC Symposium.
“Epistemic Judgment and Motivation”, Leuven-Southampton Epistemology Workshop, KU Leuven.
“Excuses, Exemptions, and Derivative Norms”, XXV SIUCC: SEFA’s Workshop with Timothy Williamson, University of Valencia.
“Excusing Prospective Agents”, European Epistemology Network Meeting, Paris.
“Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content”, Second Leuven-Cologne-Bonn Epistemology Meeting, KU Leuven.
Response to Daniel Whiting’s “Rational Belief as (a Sort of) Safe Belief”, Workshop on the Normative Significance of Normative Beliefs, University of Southampton.
“Is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?”, CLAW/RTAP Seminar, KU Leuven.
“Knowledge and Attributability”, Epistemic Norms Conference, KU Leuven.
“Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse”, First Leuven-Cologne-Bonn Epistemology Meeting, University of Cologne.
“Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction”, JustGroningen: Workshop on Epistemic Justification, University of Groningen.
“Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction”, Leuven-Bristol Workshop, KU Leuven.
“Epistemic Conditions on ‘Ought’: E=K as a Case Study”, CLAW/RTAP Seminar, KU Leuven.
A Dilemma for McDowellian neo-Mooreanism”, European Epistemology Network Meeting, Autonomous University of Madrid.
Predicate Logic (70:258)
Topics in Analytic Philosophy II (70:497)
Intro to Philosophy (70:160)
History of Analytic Philosophy (70:375)